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Abstract
Animal movement networks are essential in understanding and containing the spread
of infectious diseases in farming industries. Due to its confidential nature, movement
data for the US swine farming population is not readily available. Hence, we propose a
method to generate such networks from limited data available in the public domain.
As a potentially devastating candidate, we simulate the spread of African swine fever
virus (ASFV) in our generated network and analyze how the network structure affects
the disease spread. We find that high in-degree farm operations (i.e., markets) play
critical roles in the disease spread. We also find that high in-degree based targeted
isolation and hypothetical vaccinations are more effective for disease control compared
to other centrality-based mitigation strategies. The generated networks can be made
more robust by validation with more data whenever more movement data will be
available.
Introduction
Animal movement networks are important to model disease outbreaks and identify the
pathways of disease spread. In the US, pig farm data including herd sizes,
geolocations, and movements between farms are difficult to obtain due to the sensitive
nature of data and potential economic risk of making such information public.
Epidemiologists and other researchers who need such data have to rely on models that
can disaggregate available county or state level data. One such example is the work of
Burdett et al., who developed a simulation model to quantify pig population and
generate geolocation of individual farms [1]. However, this model does not produce
movement data. In another work by Valdes-Donoso et al., machine learning techniques
were used to predict movement networks in the State of Minnesota [2]. A recent work
uses a maximum information entropy approach to estimate movement probabilities
among swine farms [3] and suggests that the ’small-world phenomenon’ could make
the US swine industry vulnerable to infectious disease outbreaks. Despite several
efforts, pig level networks in the US swine industry are not readily available for
simulating disease outbreaks. One way to overcome this issue is to design a network
generator that can produce synthetic swine networks given some of the available
movement network characteristics and census data.
There has been substantial work in the area of graph generation. The most basic
random graph model is the Erdo¨s - Re´nyi model [4] that can produce graphs with a
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certain edge probability between any pair of vertices. The vertex degrees of such
random graphs follow the Poisson distribution [5]. There are several mechanisms to
generate graphs with prescribed degree sequences. Milo et al. describes [6] two
mechanisms: switching algorithm [7, 8] and matching algorithm [5, 9]. In the switching
algorithm, graphs are generated based on a degree sequence and the edges are shuffled
without changing the degrees to introduce randomness. The matching algorithm is
also called the configuration model [10] where stubs (open ended handles) are assigned
to vertices and later joined pairwise completely at random. Our limited movement
data situation with a swine movement network presents us with a unique challenge
where we have several different vertex types with their given average in/out degrees
and their range of values [2]. We also have the probability of having a directed edge
from one vertex type to another. Using these two sets of data, we design a network
generator that uses a modified version of the configuration model and the generalized
random graph model [10]. Generated random graphs have been used for various
purposes that includes running outbreak simulations [11] and predicting the impacts
of disease control [12]. Pig movement networks have been analyzed and found to be
useful in predicting the risk of infectious disease outbreaks [13]. The effects of
immunizations based on network centrality metrics have been explored before [14, 15]
for human diseases and such studies can suggest efficient strategies for disease control.
In this paper, we use several proven network metrics to understand disease spreading
phenomena in pig networks.
African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious infection that poses as a threat for
the pork industry due to its high mortality and no effective vaccine or cure [16].
Several recent outbreaks in Romania, Bulgaria and Belgium have already threatened
European pork producers [17, 18]. China, the largest pork producing country has an
ongoing ASF outbreak and has reportedly culled 1,170,000 hogs as of 3rd October
2019 [19]. They reported their first outbreak in early August 2018 and since then
there have been about 158 outbreaks in 32 provinces [19]. Several major Chinese pork
producers have cut their profit forecasts, some of them are expecting as much as 80%
reduction compared to 2017 [20]. The Chinese officials have undertaken several
methods in order to control the outbreaks that include, culling of all pigs within 3km
of the infected area, pig movement restrictions, surveillance around
containment/protection zones, and destruction of pig products [21]. The analysis of
Herrera-Ibata et al. finds that although US has a low risk of ASF introduction overall,
multiple states such as Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are the ones to be more
vigilant about for an ASF introduction by the legal import of live pigs [22]. There
have been several attempts to model ASF outbreaks. Barongo et al., used a stochastic
compartmental model to investigate the effects of control measures on ASFV and
found that early intervention can help in managing the ASF epidemics [23]. The
effects of residue from deceased animals were included in the work of Halasa et al. to
simulate the spread of ASFV [24]. Using transmission experiments on the Georgia
2007/1 ASFV strain, Guinat et al. estimated pig-to-pig transmission parameters for
both within pen and between pen infections and they found the reproductive ratios to
be 5.0 and 2.7 respectively [25]. On the other hand, Gulenkin et al. estimated the
basic reproductive ratio for the outbreaks in the Russian Federation to be 8-11 within
the infected farms and 2-3 between farms [26]. Barongo et al. also estimated this ratio
for Uganda outbreaks to be in the range of 1.58-3.24 depending on various estimation
methods they used [27]. In another work, Guinat et al. inferred transmission
parameters using pig mortality data [28]. A recent work by Hu et al. used Bayesian
inference on previous transmission experiments [25] to account for unobserved
infection times and latent periods [29]. Most of the ASFV research is focused on
parameter estimates while several others investigate virus importation risk in US
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mainland. Despite the numerous studies, there is a lack of knowledge on how the swine
industry in the US would be affected in case an ASFV outbreak starts in the US.
The contributions of this paper are several: i) we propose a swine movement
network generator, ii) we run ASFV epidemic simulations and compare how different
farm operation types affect the outbreak dynamics, and iii) we analyze and compare
the effectiveness of multiple centrality based targeted control measures. In the Results
section, we describe our generated farm level network along with the outcomes of
preliminary network analyses. We also explain the ASFV outbreak simulation results
and compare different operation types as sources of infection. Finally, we investigate
the impact of different disease control strategies. The Materials and Methods section
contains detailed information on swine movement data, network generation, analysis
methods, ASFV epidemic model, and its parameters. The pseudocodes for the
algorithms are detailed in Appendix A.
Results
Movement Network
The generated farm level movement network is shown in Fig 1. This directed network
contains 84 farms from two Minnesota counties (Stevens and Rice). There are five
different swine operations marked as: Boar Stud (B), Farrow (F), Nursery (N),
Grower (G), and Market (M) with 3, 22, 12, 39, and 8 sites respectively. A visual
inspection of Fig 1 suggests that the movement of pigs start from farrow and nursery
operations and end at the markets while a large number of grower farms lie in those
paths. We also analyze the node centrality measures of the generated network which
are shown in Fig 2. As the network is generated based on degree centrality data
(Table 2), it is expected that the results shown in this figure (Kin and Kout) would
resemble it. The market operations have significantly high in-degree centralities
(median value of 9) while the nursery operations have high out-degree centralities
(median value of 3) followed by farrow and grower operations (both with median
values of 2). The farrow operations have high betweenness values (median of 8.9167)
followed by grower operations (median of 4).
To understand how the connectivity in the farm network can be disrupted, we
perform a robustness analysis. Based on the node centrality measures of the network,
we rank the nodes in a decreasing order and create three lists (Kin, Kout, and BC).
Going through those lists, we remove (isolate) nodes one by one from the network and
compute the largest connected component in every step. The results are depicted in
Fig 3, where the relative sizes of the largest components are plotted against three
centrality based node removal/isolation schemes. While all three schemes decrease the
component sizes, the removal of high Kin nodes demonstrates relatively better
outcome in breaking the network. Approximately 94.1% of the farms in total can be
isolated from the original network by isolating only 33.3% of the high in-degree farm
nodes. For the other two schemes, isolation of 33.3% high centrality (BC and Kout)
farms will isolate about 38.1% of the farms in total. The in-degree centrality based
isolation strategy shows a significant (about ∼ 2.5 times) improvement over other
options.
Outbreak Dynamics
In a generated swine pig level network of the two Minnesota counties, we introduce an
ASFV outbreak by choosing a pig farm uniformly at random as the seed farm. Within
this selected farm, we infect at most 10 (if there are more than 10) pigs to introduce
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Fig 1. Generated farm level swine movement network The graph shows the
generated network at the farm level. The solid circles (nodes) indicate swine
operations and the gray arrows connecting them indicate pig shipments with directions.
The swine operations (nodes) are labeled according to their types: Boar Stud (B),
Farrow (F), Nursery (N), Grower/Finisher (G), and Market/Slaughterhouse (M).
the pathogen and observe the progression of the disease spread. The averaged out
results of 1000 independent simulations are shown in Fig 4. We use the parameter
values given in Table 5. For the infection rate, β, we use the median value given in
Table 5 along with the values 25% above and below the median as indicated in the
legends of the plots in Fig 4. We observe outbreaks lasting about 378 days for the
median value of β which infects about 1.84% [95% CI 1.65 2.03] of the pork
population. For a network of 249,150 pigs, this roughly translates to about 4,584 [95%
CI 4,111 5,047] pigs dying from the outbreak. A 25% increase in β would lengthen the
outbreak duration by about 33% and affect twice as many pigs. A 25% reduction in β
shortens the outbreaks by 32% and reduces the outbreak size by 59.8%. For the β
value around the median and above, the outbreak reaches its peak within 95-100 days
and for the β values below the median, the outbreaks do not surpass the initial
fraction of infected pigs.
For the results of Fig 4, we infected about 10 pigs in a farm that was chosen
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Fig 2. Centrality measures of the generated network The three set of boxplots
show three different centrality measures as marked (In-degree (Kin), Out-degree
(Kout), and Betweenness (BC)). The five different pig operations are marked in the
horizontal axes as: Boar Stud (B), Farrow (F), Nursery (N), Grower/Finisher (G), and
Market/Slaughterhouse (M). Each boxplot shows the range between 25th and the 75th
percentiles (blue box) and the median (red line). The values outside 1.5 times the
inter-quartile range are marked as outliers (+ signs).
uniformly at random from all the farms. As there are five different pig operation types
in our network, we would like to evaluate how each type affect the outbreaks. We run
independent sets of simulations where we target a specific operation type (boar stud,
farrow, nursery, grower, and market) in each set. We select an operation of that
particular type and use it to seed the infection. It is important to note that, the
number of pig operations in each type/category is different. The pig population also
vary among operations. In our generated network, we have approximately 3.82%,
28.72%, 11.73%, 44.86%, and 10.87% pigs in Boar Stud, Farrow, Nursery, Grower, and
Market operations respectively. The outcomes are shown in Fig 5. Here, we define the
term ‘Epidemic Attack Rate’ as,
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Fig 3. Network robustness analysis by the gradual removal/isolation of
farm nodes. The farm nodes are removed in a decreasing order of different centrality
measures and the size of the largest weakly connected component (at the farm-level) is
plotted. Both of the axes are plotted as fractions of total farms in the network. For
the removal of nodes, they are separately ranked with three independent centrality
measures: high betweenness centrality (BC), high out-degree centrality (Kout), and
high in-degree centrality (Kin).
Fig 4. Time series outbreak results Simulated outbreak dynamics in the
generated swine network. The results shown above are the averages of 1000
independent simulations. To start each outbreak, a herd/farm was selected uniformly
at random where we infected up to 10 pigs which were selected randomly from that
particular herd. The simulations were run for three different β values (1.672, 1.254,
and 2.090) which are shown using different line styles and colors as indicated by the
legends. The shaded regions in the plots show 95% confidence intervals. The left plot
shows the fraction of infected pigs and the right plot shows the fraction of removed
(dead) pigs over time for the generated pig network.
Epidemic Attack Rate =
Number of pigs infected during the outbreak
Total number of pigs
(1)
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We find that, the markets are most capable among the five types in spreading the
infection while grower and farrow farm types are the second and third most important
to consider. Although grower farms have 4.13 times the population of the market sites,
the market sites cause 1.98 times bigger outbreaks (0.0406 [95% CI 0.0398 0.0414])
compared to grower sites (0.0205 [95% CI 0.0199 0.0212]). Despite that, the duration
of the outbreaks caused by the farrow, grower, and market sites are quite comparable
(387 [95% CI 374 401], 399 [95% CI 392 409], and 423 [95% CI 416 431] days
respectively). The large populations in the grower and farrow farms explain have
contributions towards their large outbreaks. Market sites, on the other hand, are
potent infection spreaders due to their high connectivity (high in-degree centrality)
with remaining farm types.
Fig 5. Outbreak analysis based on source of infection Simulated outbreak
statistics in the generated swine network. The results shown above are the averages of
10,000 independent simulations. The 95% confidence intervals are shown in red error
bars. To start each outbreak, a pig operation was chosen from a given type (either
Boar Stud, Farrow, Nursery, Grower, or Market) and up to 10 pigs from that
operation were infected. The left plot shows the epidemic attack rates as defined in
Equation 1 and the right plot shows the duration of outbreaks.
Control Measures
Due to the lack of cure for African swine fever virus, movement restriction remains a
key control method for the policy makers. For this experiment, we use three different
network centrality measures (in-degree centrality, Kin, out-degree centrality, Kout, and
betweenness centrality, BC) for the farm nodes and sort the farms in a descending
order based on these measures. Next, we gradually place movement restrictions on an
increasing number of farms selected from the sorted lists and run outbreak simulations.
The attack rates and the outbreak lengths are compared in Fig 6 for three different
network centrality measures. Placing movement restrictions based on in-degrees (Kin)
demonstrate the best performance in disease control while restrictions based on
betweenness centralities (BC) perform the worst. Isolation of top 5 farms based on
Kin shows about 63.04% [95% CI 61.96 64.13] reduction in the outbreak size (attack
rate) and 51.59% [95% CI 50.26 52.91] reduction in outbreak duration compared to
the situation without any control measure (Fig 4). For the Kout and BC based
isolation schemes, we observe 19.6% [95% CI 16.85 21.74] and 4.9% [95% CI 1.63 7.61]
reductions respectively in outbreak sizes with 8.5% [95% CI 6.61 11.64] and 6.4% [95%
CI 4.5 8.47] reductions respectively in outbreak durations when we isolate 5 farms.
As there is no effective vaccine for ASF, we model hypothetical vaccines with 80%
efficacy. This efficacy value has been mentioned in other cases as a nominal
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Fig 6. Comparison of different targeted isolation schemes based on farm
node centrality measures. Three different movement restriction strategies (high in
degree, Kin, high out degree, Kout, and high betweenness, BC) are compared. For
each strategy, different number of farms are isolated from a centrality based sorted
descending list. The left plot shows the epidemic attack rates and the right plot shows
the epidemic lengths. The data points are mean values computed from 10,000
stochastic simulations and the shaded regions show 95% confidence intervals.
requirement to make a vaccine marketable [30]. For our model, it means that, 80 out
of 100 vaccinated pigs will be fully immune to the invading pathogen. We use the same
set of centrality based sorting strategies to select farms for vaccinations (in-degree Kin,
out-degree Kout, and betweenness centrality, BC measures). The results are shown in
Fig 7. Once again, immunizing farms based on high in-degree (Kin) is found to be the
most effective strategy while immunization based on high betweenness centrality (BC)
is found to be least effective in disease control. Vaccination of top 5 farms based on
Kin shows about 59.78% [95% CI 58.70 60.87] reduction in the outbreak size (attack
rate) and 44.18% [95% CI 42.86 45.77] reduction in outbreak duration compared to
the situation without any control measure (Fig 4). For the Kout and BC based
immunization schemes, we observe 17.93% [95% CI 15.22 20.65] and 3.8% [95% CI
0.54 7.07] reductions respectively in outbreak size with 5.56% [95% CI 2.91 7.67] and
5.03% [95% CI 2.12 7.94] reductions respectively in outbreak duration when we
vaccinate 5 farms. The comparative results of the vaccination strategies resemble the
results found in the previous experiment for movement restriction measures.
Conclusion
In this study, we have proposed a method to generate movement networks from
available data on the US swine industry, where we have utilized movement network
characteristics available for two counties in Minnesota. Using the generated farm-level
movement network, we have analyzed multiple centrality properties and performed a
robustness analysis to obtain a better insight into the network structure. Using the
generated pig-level contact network, we formulated a stochastic SEIR model for the
transmission of African swine fever. We ran outbreak simulations and examined
time-series data with different pig operation types as sources of infection and
compared the outcomes. Finally, we analyzed and compared the outcomes of
centrality-based targeted isolation and vaccination methods.
The outbreak simulations show that if ASFV is introduced in a random herd, and
it is allowed to spread unchecked, it may affect approximately 1.84% of the total swine
population with high probability for the two counties in our consideration. Among the
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Fig 7. Comparison of different targeted vaccination schemes based on farm
node centrality measures. Three different vaccination strategies (high in degree,
Kin, high out degree, Kout, and high betweenness, BC) are compared. For each
strategy, different number of farms are immunized from a centrality based sorted
descending list. The hypothetical vaccines are 80% effective. The left plot shows the
epidemic attack rates and the right plot shows the epidemic lengths. The data points
are mean values computed from 10,000 stochastic simulations and the shaded regions
show 95% confidence intervals.
five different farm types, infecting the pig population in the market operations causes
the most significant outbreaks. The high connectivity of the markets with other farm
types and the both-way transmission caused by fomites (e.g., transport vehicles) are
the reasons behind such high impact of the markets. The large populations in grower
and farrow farm types also make them significant in spreading ASFV infections.
Control measures can target these farm types in the event of such outbreaks. In our
preliminary farm network analysis, we find that the nursery operations have high
out-degrees while the market operations have high in-degrees. We also find that
grower operations have high betweenness centrality values. A network robustness
analysis reveals that isolating high in-degree farms disrupt the connectivity in the
network the most compared to using other centrality measures.
When we examine the impact of centrality-based targeted control measures, the
outcomes reinforce our results from the preliminary analysis. We have examined two
different control measures with outbreak simulations: movement restriction and
hypothetical vaccine. In both cases, we find that controlling farms with high in-degree
proves to be beneficial in containing the disease spread. Implementing control in high
out-degree farms proves to be slightly better than doing so in high betweenness farms,
while both are inferior compared to high in-degree based targeted control. In a
separate independent analysis (Fig 5), market operations have proven to be the most
potent sources of infections in causing relatively more significant outbreaks compared
to other farm types. As the market operations have very high in-degree, our results
consistently suggest that these sites should be prioritized in the case of ASFV
outbreaks.
Limited public data availability on swine movement in the US compels us to rely
on probabilistic network-generation methods to close analytical gaps. Available data
on Stevens and Rice counties of Minnesota aided the construction of the movement
network. However, these data may be inadequate for the extrapolation of more
extensive swine-movement networks. Despite that, our generated network has degree
distributions that agree with the given data and the real-world characteristics of the
swine production industry. If additional data for movement networks in other
locations become available, our network generation algorithms can be used with little
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or no modifications, depending on the data. We also made a simplifying assumption of
having one operation type at a single site, while in practice, there can be multiple
operation types. In addition to that, individual-based simulation models are limited
due to computational complexities caused by a large population. Metapopulation
models can be a viable solution when considering state-level networks. The network
generation techniques can be improved further if more data on swine production
operations is made available. Distributed databases could be used to improve
traceability and data sharing for the agriculture production supply chain. Further
efforts could be made in performing surveys, raising awareness, and motivating the
livestock industry to participate in data exchange to support research solutions that
can benefit the industry operations.
Materials and Methods
US Swine Data
We generate the swine movement network utilizing some of the network characteristics
(mixing matrix, in-degree, and out-degree centralities) reported in the
Valdes-Donoso [2] paper. The mixing matrix is given in Table 1 and the centralities
are shown in Table 2. We define several pig operation types that include farms and
markets. Using the operation type distribution described in the same work [2], we
classify 5 different pig operations (Boar Stud, Farrow, Nursery, Grower, and Market)
as shown in Table 3. The operation types are defined below,
• Boar Stud. These farms are used to keep male boars for breeding.
• Farrow. Sows are moved to these farrowing farms to give birth (farrow). Piglets
stay here up to 3 weeks.
• Nursery. Piglets are moved to nursery after weaning where they could stay up
to 8 weeks.
• Grower. Pigs are moved from nursery to grower/finisher farms where they will
gain market weight at about six months of age.
• Market. The market type includes buying stations and/or slaughter plants.
Obtaining data from United States Department of Agriculture - National Agricultural
Statistics Service (USDA-NASS) [31], we find that two counties (Rice & Stevens) of
Minnesota have 84 farms and 249,150 pigs in total. We take the 84 farms and as the
operation types are unknown, assign types randomly based on the distribution shown
in Table 3.
Table 1. Mixing matrix (probability of movement from row type to column
type) for swine movement network [2]. The pig operation types are
abbreviated as B (Boar Stud), F (Farrow), N (Nursery), G (Grower), and
M (Market).
B F N G M
B 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
F 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.10
N 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00
G 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.40
M 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
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Table 2. Movement network degree centrality data [2].
B F N G M
In-degree Average 0.67 0.92 0.77 1.05 11.73
SE 0.67 0.14 0.1 0.07 3.59
Max 2 5 2 5 57
Out-degree Average 1.00 2.08 3.07 1.74 0.46
SE 0 0.26 0.62 0.15 0.18
Max 1 8 12 12 3
Table 3. Pig operation type distribution.
Boar Stud(B) Farrow(F) Nursery(N) Grower(G) Market(M)
1.27% 27% 12.66% 51.9% 7.17%
Availability of operation type distribution data is incomplete as well, there are
several suppressed data fields. We allot pigs in those unknown fields randomly and
make sure that the aggregate statistics are maintained. The adjusted combined
statistics for Stevens and the Rice counties are provided in Table 4.
Table 4. Distribution of pigs in Stevens and Rice counties of Minnesota.
Farm Size No. of Farms No. of Pigs
1 to 24 17 204
25 to 49 0 0
50 to 99 0 0
100 to 199 2 300
200 to 499 3 700
500 to 999 11 7,904
1,000+ 51 240,042
Total 84 249,150
While the USDA-NASS data provide the total number of farms and pigs in a size
class, it is impossible to infer the number of pigs at individual farms. Hence, we use a
random allocation mechanism to assign the number of pigs for each farm while
maintaining the aggregate statistics of Table 4. Once we generate the network edges,
we assign a weight to them to indicate amount/rate of movement via that edge.
According to the work of Spencer R. Wayne [32], the Rice and the Stevens counties
experience mean shipment of 21 and 15 per year and median shipment of 10 and 7 per
year respectively. Based on those values, our combined network is estimated to have
mean shipment of 17.38 per year and median shipment of 8.5 per year. We use
lognormal distribution and assign randomly generated shipment rate values to network
links.
Network Terminology
We use several network structure and analysis related terminologies throughout this
paper. These terminologies are described below,
• Network/Graph. A network (also called graph) is a structure consisting of
nodes (also called vertices) and links (also called edges). A link connects two
vertices and it can be either directed or undirected.
• Stub. A stub is half a link. It’s a link with a node on one end and an empty
handle on the other end. Empty handles of two stubs can be joined together to
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form the link and thus create a connection between two nodes.
• Path, Shortest Path. A path is a sequence of links which joins a sequence of
vertices which are all distinct. A shortest path is the minimum length path
between two nodes in a network.
• Connected Component. A connected component (also referred to as a
component) is a subset of nodes where there is a path between every pair of
nodes in that subset. Two distinct components aren’t connected by any path. If
all nodes in a component are connected via bi-directional paths then the
component is strongly connected, otherwise it is called weakly connected (path
in one direction). In this paper, we consider weakly connected components as
transmission can happen in the reverse direction of the animal movement via
fomites (e.g. transport vehicles).
We use several centrality measures to determine the importance of the nodes. The
centrality measure can quantitatively characterize how important a node is in the
network.
• Degree Centrality. The degree (K) of a node is the number of links associated
with that node. In case of directed networks, we define in-degree (Kin) as the
number of links going into the node and out-degree (Kout) as the number of
links coming out of the node.
• Betweenness Centrality. There is a shortest path for every pair of nodes in a
connected component. The betweenness centrality (BC) of a node is the total
number of shortest paths that pass through that node (not counting the paths
starting from or ending at that node).
Network Generation
The swine network is synthesized using the available swine farm and movement related
data described in the previous section. The network generation process is completed
in several stages:
1. Assign each farm node a single operation type randomly based on the farm type
distribution given in Table 3.
2. Assign directed in and out-degree values or handles (stubs) to each farm node
randomly based on the degree distribution given in Table 2.
3. Connect out-handle (stub) of a farm node to in-handle (stub) of another farm
node randomly, based on the mixing matrix given in Table 1.
4. Assign shipment rate values to all the directed links from a lognormal
distribution with the obtained mean and the median shipment rate values.
5. Assign each farm a certain number of pigs randomly, based on the distribution
given in Table 4.
6. Generate the within-farm undirected contact links among the pigs based on the
Erdo¨s - Re´nyi process with 50% probability.
7. Convert the shipment rates of farm links into probabilities and generate
between-farm undirected contact links for the pigs based on those rates.
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We generate a farm level movement network at step 4 and a pig level contact
network at step 7. It is necessary to mention that, working with a graph that has
249,149 nodes, is computationally intractable due to the large number of within-farm
links among the pigs. Hence, we scale down the pig population by a constant factor of
20, which makes the network small enough to be computationally feasible, while
retaining sufficient pig nodes to maintain connectivity properties of the farm level
network. As a consequence, most of our ASF model results are qualitative
investigations of outbreak behavior.
ASFV Epidemic Model
Our network based epidemic model is shown in Fig 8. Using the farm level movement
network, we generate a pig level movement network. In this network, each node is an
individual pig and the links connecting a node to other nodes indicate interactions
with other pigs (nodes). A pig has a lot more links to other pigs within the same farm
compared to pigs which are at other farms. The links to other farms are generated
based on the movement network. In Fig 8, a host node (pig) is marked using a solid
circle and the links to other nodes are marked by the solid lines. A host (pig) can get
exposed from any of its infected neighbors at the rate of β, which is defined as the
infection rate. For modeling African swine fever infection dynamics, we divide the pig
population into four groups: Susceptible (S), Exposed (E), Infected (I), and
Removed/Dead (R). The healthy pigs which are free from ASF infection are classified
as Susceptibles. If such a healthy pig comes into contact with infected pigs containing
the virus, it may get infected at the rate βYi(t), where Yi(t) is the number of infected
neighbors of node i at time t. If the transmission of pathogen occurs, a healthy pig
enters into the Exposed group where it stays for the duration of the incubation period.
On average, this period is denoted by 1/σ. Once it shows symptoms, it moves into the
Infected group. It stays there for an average time of 1/γ before it is removed. As for
ASF, the mortality is assumed to be 100% and no pig recovers. Hence, all infected
pigs die at the end of the infected period. However, in multiple cases for our
simulations, we will hypothetically vaccinate pigs. Based on the vaccine efficacy, alive
pigs may move to the removed class too.
Fig 8. ASF epidemic model. The network based SEIR epidemic model for
African swine fever virus. The black solid circles indicate host nodes (individual pigs)
and the solid lines connecting them indicate contacts (direct or fomites) that can act
as infection pathways of ASFV. Each node can be in any of the four states,
Susceptible (S), Exposed (E), Infected (I), or Recovered (R). The rates at which a
host can move from one state to another are indicated by the parameters (See Table 5)
adjacent to corresponding arrows. Here, Yi(t) is the number of infected contacts of
node i at time t.
The model parameters are shown in Table 5. The last column in this table
November 12, 2019 13/19
mentions the different sources from where we obtained the parameter values. For β,
we used estimated data from [28] where median transmission rate values were
computed for 9 herds. These values are listed in Table 6. We take the weighted
median from this set of data and use that β value in our simulations. We use the
well-developed GEMFsim [33] tool to run our simulations.
Table 5. ASFV Epidemic Model parameters.
Symbol Definition Range Value Reference
β Transmission Rate 0.7 - 2.2 1.6719 [28] [29]
1/σ Latent Period - 7.78 [28]
1/γ Infectious Period - 8.3 [28]
Table 6. Transmission rate estimated for 9 pig herds by Guinat et al. [28]
Herd Size 1614 1949 1753 1833 1320 600 600 600 2145
β 2 1 2.2 0.7 1.6 2.1 1.6 2.2 0.8
Appendix A: Network Generation Algorithms
The basic outline of network generation is described in Algorithm 1.
input :NF , P IG DAT, SF, P, F DIST,M MIX,K DAT, SHP DAT
output :GF , GP
// Assigns different production types to individual farms uniformly
at random.
1 F TY PE ← F TY PE GEN(F DIST,NF );
// Generates a directed farm graph with weighted links/edges
(shipment rate)
2 GF ← F GRAPH GEN(M MIX,F TY PE,NF ,K DAT, SHP DAT );
// Assigns pigs to different farms based on pig data obtained from
NASS. Scales the population by a factor SF.
3 PIG LIST ← PIG ALLOT (PIG DAT,NF , SF );
// Generates a pig level graph. The number of pigs in each farm are
scaled by the scale factor (SF)
4 GP ← P GRAPH GEN(GF , NF , P IG LIST, P );
Algorithm 1: Basic outline of graph generation
In the above box, NF is the number of farms, PIG DAT is the pig distribution
data given in Table 4, SF is the scaling factor used to scale the pig level graph in
order to make it computationally feasible in our model, P is the probability of within
farm contacts between pigs, F DIST is the farm type distribution shown in Table 3,
M MIX is the mixing matrix shown in Table 1, K DAT contains the degree
centrality data from Table 2, and SHP DAT contains the mean and median shipment
data. The farm level and pig level graphs are represented by GF and GP respectively.
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We describe the F GRAPH GEN function in more detail in Algorithm 2.
input :M MIX,F TY PE,NF ,K DAT, SHP DAT
output :GF
// Allocates in and out-degrees based on production types.
1 DEG ALLOC ← DEG GEN(F TY PE,K DAT );
2 for SRC NODE ← 1 to NF do
// Allocates in and out-degrees based on production types.
3 MAX KOUT = DEG ALLOC(SRC NODE,OUTDEG);
4 for k ← 1 to MAX KOUT do
// Pick the destination type randomly from the mixing matrix
distribution.
5 DST TY PE ∼M MIX(F TY PE(SRC NODE));
// Find and sort the destination nodes based on probabilities.
6 DST NODES ← {n : n ∈ [1, NF ] and F TY PE(n) = DST TY PE};
// Pick the destination node which has the biggest gap (max
in-degree - current in-degree) to cover up.
7 DST NODE ← n ∈ DST NODES that maximizes
(KIN(n,MAX)−KIN(n,CUR));
// generate shipment data from log-normal distribution with
mean and median shipment values given in SHP DAT.
8 SHP RATE ∼ Lognormal(SHP DAT );
// Create the link with generated shipment rate as weight.
9 GF ← GF + EDGE(SRC NODE,DST NODE,SHP RATE);
10 end
11 end
Algorithm 2: F GRAPH GEN
We also describe another key component of the graph generator, P GRAPH GEN
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in Algorithm 3, which generates the pig level network.
input :GF , NF , P IG LIST, P
output :GP
1 for f ← 1 to NF do
// List of pigs in the farm f.
2 PIG NODES ← PIG LIST (f);
// Generate Erdos-Renyi graph for list of pig nodes with edge
probability P.
3 EDGES = ERDOS RENY I(PIG NODES,P );
// Add the generated edges to the pig level graph.
4 GP ← GP + EDGES;
5 end
// Normalize the edge weights to be used as probabilities.
6 GNORM
F
← GF /MAX(GF );
7 for each (F1, F2) pair where F1, F2 ∈ GF and F1! = F2 do
// Probability of movement from farm F1 to any other farms.
8 PFROM ← G
NORM
F
(F1, ALL);
// Probability of movement from any farm to farm F2.
9 PTO ← G
NORM
F
(ALL,F2);
10 for each P1 ∈ PIG LIST (F1) do
11 for each P2 ∈ PIG LIST (F2) do
12 r ∼ Uniform(0, 1);
13 if r ≤ PFROM × PTO then
14 GP ← GP + EDGE(P1, P2);
15 end
16 end
17 end
Algorithm 3: P GRAPH GEN
Supporting Information
S1 File. FarmNodeList. List of farm nodes with their operation types.
S2 File. FarmEdgeList. List of farm links and their weights.
S3 File. PigsNodeList. List of pig nodes and the farms they belong to.
S4 File. PigsEdgeList. List of pig links and their weights (all are equally weighted
to 1).
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